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PUBLIC UTILITIES
COMMISSION

BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF HAWAII

In the Matter of the Application of) DOCKET NO. 2008-0303
)
HAWAIIAN ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC.)
HAWAII ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY, INC.)
MAUI ELECTRIC COMPANY, LIMITED)
)
For Approval of the Advanced Metering)
Infrastructure (AMI) Project and Request to)
Commit Capital Funds, to Defer and Amortize)
Software Development Costs, to Begin)
Installation of Meters and Implement)
Time-of-Use Rates, for Approval)
of Accounting and Ratemaking)
Treatment, and Other Matters.)

LIFE OF THE LAND'S TESTIMONY

HENRY Q CURTIS (LOL-T-1).

MOTION FOR DISCLOSURE

&

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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1 I am Henry Q Curtis, Executive Director and Vice President of Life of the Land.
2 I am testifying on behalf of Life of the Land on issues relating to Advanced
3 Metering Infrastructure ("AMI"), Time of Use Rates ("TOUR"), and Smart Grids.

4
5 **The Application**
6

7 On December 1, 2008, Hawaiian Electric Company, Inc. ("HECO"), Hawaii
8 Electric Light Company, Inc. ("HELCO") and Maui Electric Company, Inc.
9 ("MECO"), collectively referred to herein as the "HECO Companies" or
10 "Companies", filed an application requesting Commission approval of the
11 Advanced Metering Infrastructure ("AMI") project.
12

13 **The Parties**
14

15 February 13, 2009 the Commission granted the motions to intervene of Life of
16 the Land ("LOL"), Hawaii Renewable Energy Alliance ("HREA") and Hawaii Solar
17 Energy Alliance ("HSEA"). The HECO Companies, Consumer Advocate, LOL,
18 HREA, and HSEA are collectively herein referred to as "Parties."
19

20 **The Issues**
21

22 On April 21, 2009, the Commission amended the proposed Stipulated
23 Procedural Order agreed to by the Parties. The issues in the docket are".
24
25

- 26 1. Is the HECO Companies' proposal to implement the AMI project reasonable?
27
- 28 2. Are the estimated project costs reasonable?
29
- 30 3. Is the proposed accounting treatment of AMI project costs reasonable?
31
- 32 4. Is the proposed cost recovery of AMI project costs for ratemaking purposes
33 reasonable?

1
2 5. Are the terms and conditions of the Sensus Agreement between HECO and
3 Sensus Metering Systems, Inc. reasonable, prudent and in the public interest?

4
5 6. Are the proposed time of use rates reasonable?

6
7 **Confidentiality**

8
9 The HECO Application, dated December 1, 2008, pages 21-22 states: "A
10 summary of the agreement is provided in Exhibit 1. The Sensus Agreement is
11 confidential and proprietary and a copy will be provided separately after a
12 Protective Order is issued in this docket."

13
14 The HECO Application, dated December 1, 2008, PDF page 113 of 304 states:
15 "Exhibit 7 contains confidential information and will be provided after a
16 Protective Order is issued in this proceeding."

17
18 A HECO letter dated May 4, 2009 states: "Pursuant to the Protective Order
19 approved by the Commission on April 15, 2009 in this proceeding, the HECO
20 Companies' provide the following confidential exhibits:

21
22 Exhibit 1(A) - Advanced Metering Infrastructure Equipment and Services
23 Agreement between Sensus Metering Systems, Inc. and Hawaiian Electric
24 Company, Inc., executed on October 1, 2008 ("Sensus Agreement");

25
26 Exhibit 7, pages 5 to 8 and 10 to 21. A summary of the Sensus Agreement was
27 provided as Exhibit 1 in the Advanced Meter Infrastructure ("AMI") application.

28
29 The Companies stated that the Advanced Metering Infrastructure Equipment
30 and Services Agreement between Sensus Metering System and HECO was
31 confidential and proprietary and would be provided after a protective order was
32 issued in this docket. The Companies hereby submit the confidential Sensus
33 Agreement as Exhibit 1(A) to the AMI application."

1
2
3 Exhibit 1(A), dated April 15, 2009, page 3 states: "CONFIDENTIAL Subject to
4 Protective Order ... "Commission" mean the Public Utilities Commission of the
5 State of Hawaii"

6
7 Exhibit 1(A), dated April 15, 2009, page 31 "CONFIDENTIAL Subject to
8 Protective Order ... The islands of Oahu, Maui, and Hawaii Island (see map
9 below)."

10
11 Exhibit 7, dated April 15, 2009, page 12 states: "CONFIDENTIAL Subject to
12 Protective Order ... Lee Melville - Bachelors in Electronics, and Masters in
13 Engineering Management" This information is readily available on the web at
14 several sites including TDWorld, ZoomInfo and Enspira
15 ([http://enspiria.com/pdfs/LADWP%20Automation%20Initiative%20T&D%20W](http://enspiria.com/pdfs/LADWP%20Automation%20Initiative%20T&D%20World%20Reprint.pdf)
16 [orld%20Reprint.pdf](http://enspiria.com/pdfs/LADWP%20Automation%20Initiative%20T&D%20World%20Reprint.pdf))

17
18 Exhibit 7, dated April 15, 2009, page 5 states: "CONFIDENTIAL Subject to
19 Protective Order ... Ontario Independent Electricity System Operator: Member
20 of team charged with developing and delivering a Meter Data Management
21 Repository for IESO, the organization responsible for operating Ontario's
22 wholesale electricity markets"

23
24 This is public information: "In April 2008, the Office of Consumer Affairs,
25 Industry Canada granted the Consumers Council of Canada funding to conduct
26 research on the Government of Ontario's plan to introduce smart electricity
27 meters. The Government of Ontario is currently in the process of facilitating its
28 commitment to install 800 000 smart electricity meters in homes and small
29 businesses by the end of 2007, and throughout Ontario by 2010. The
30 introduction of the smart meters will allow for the introduction of flexible, time-
31 of-use pricing intended to encourage a conservation culture in Ontario aimed at
32 reducing overall electricity use and peak demand. The implementation of the
33 smart meter initiative is being carried out by the Ontario electricity distributors

1 with direction from the Ministry of Energy and the Ontario Energy Board. In
2 addition, the Ontario Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) has been
3 given the mandate to establish a Meter Data Management Repository, providing
4 a common infrastructure for the management and storage of consumption data
5 received through the new meters. Consumers in Ontario stand to benefit from
6 this initiative, but will also be responsible for the costs. In fact, many Ontario
7 consumers are currently paying for the costs of the meters, although the meters
8 have not yet been installed. Of more concern, the technology is not yet capable
9 of billing on the basis of time-of-use pricing"
10 (www.consumerscouncil.com/index.cfm?pid=20573)

11
12 **Motion for Disclosure**

13
14 The Commission issued a Protective Order, dated April 15, 2009. Page 6 states
15 in part: "8. Any party claiming that Information is confidential shall place upon
16 the applicable material the following legend: CONFIDENTIAL SUBJECT TO
17 PROTECTIVE ORDER Whenever only a portion of a document, transcript, or
18 other material is deemed to contain confidential information, the party shall, to
19 the extent reasonably practicable, limit the claim of confidentiality to only such
20 portion."

21
22 In order to complete our testimony and prepare for cross-examination, Life of
23 the Land needs to be able to discuss, at the very minimum, the Agreement's
24 effective date and termination conditions (Exhibit 1(A), pages 18-19), and the
25 AMI System Performance Specification (Exhibit 1(A) Exhibit E, pages 80-89).

26
27 **What is Advanced Meter Infrastructure?**

28
29 Advanced Meter Infrastructure ("AMI") is a cost savings system (automatic
30 meter reading) that will enable implementation of the Smart Grid.

1 **What is a Smart Grid?**

2
3 A smart grid is an electricity transmission and distribution system joining
4 traditional and new, digital age, communication, sensor, and power engineering
5 technology. The goal behind the smart grid is to improve upon current
6 standards of grid performance by making it more efficient, “self healing,”
7 secure, able to support wide use of distributed generation, and enable end-
8 users to regulate their own equipment for optimal savings and functioning.
9 Thus, the term “smart grid” does not refer to a specific technology, like smart
10 meters or voltage sensors, but to a grid system that possesses the above
11 characteristics.

12
13 Once the infrastructure for the smart grid is in place, utilities will be able to see
14 how much energy is being spent at any point within the network and tell, in
15 real time, if there are problems or looming blackouts. The utilities can then
16 isolate those areas or decrease the load on the grid to solve the problems.

17
18 Alternatively, there are currently areas of the country where utilities only
19 become aware of a blackout once a customer calls and reports it.

20
21 End-users will also be informed of details regarding personal power
22 consumption and use in real time, down to which appliances, outlets, specific
23 buildings, or parts of their businesses are using the most energy, and be able to
24 adjust their usage accordingly.

25
26 A key facet of the smart grid is that because the two-way communication
27 between the utilities and consumers can happen in real time, the price of
28 energy will fluctuate depending on peak energy usage and demand times. This
29 means that energy prices will be highest during the “rush-hour” of energy usage
30 and lowest during downtime. Ideally, end-users will decrease energy
31 consumption during price hikes, which will ease the grid during the most
32 critical times and lower the chance of blackouts.

1 The idea is that the utilities be able to better manage the load on the grid, while
2 the consumers save money on their monthly bills. Also, smart grids will allow
3 users to have the option of using certain appliances or power in general only
4 when preferred renewable sources of energy like wind or solar are available.

5
6 As the smart grid integrates large transmission and distribution systems, it will
7 be possible to incorporate renewable energy and new technology into the grid
8 system effectively. Energy technologies to be incorporated include electric
9 vehicles and plug-in hybrids, energy storage, wind turbines, Photovoltaic
10 Systems, Geothermal, Biomass, and Combined Heat and Power (CHP).

11
12 The smart grid can effectively transport the various sources of energy to their
13 optimal locations, so, for example, areas without significant wind can still
14 benefit from wind turbines built in the Northeast or the coastal regions.
15 Potentially, the smart grid will revolutionize the energy, environmental,
16 business, and communication fields.

17
18 **Who has a smart grid?**

19
20 Not too many countries, states or cities have actually implemented smart grids.
21 Italy was the first country to develop a smart grid having installed 27 million
22 smart meters from 2001-05.

23
24 **What are the benefits to a smart grid?**

25
26 There are many associated benefits with a smart grid in comparison to the grid
27 in place today. The smart grid will be

28
29 Efficient/Economical – As the grid works today, it is built so that it can meet
30 the highest expected power demands, meaning that billions of dollars are spent
31 on building towers and power plants that are rarely even used. This is to such
32 an extreme that barely over 50 percent of the grid infrastructure standing today
33 is utilized, as some parts of the grid are used for only a few hours each year

1 during annual peak energy spikes. Under a more decentralized grid system
2 able to accurately sense grid load, the overall energy consumption will be more
3 harmonized, with rounder spikes, and more effective means of dealing with high
4 loads.

5
6 Furthermore, as the grid will be much better able to avoid large scale blackouts
7 and more quickly solve grid problems, a lot of money can be saved in the
8 process. For example, the August 2003 blackout of the Northeast cost \$6
9 billion, a figure that could have either been avoided altogether or greatly
10 reduced. The increased efficiency of the grid will also increase its reliability, as
11 outages can be better anticipated and studied afterwards if they do occur. Also,
12 sensors will be able to gauge the equipment performance and condition data –
13 the result will be a general decrease in operation and maintenance costs, with
14 savings from productivity improvements, such as the elimination of routine
15 tasks and reductions in material use.

16
17 The smart grid will also allow end-users to make informed decisions about
18 energy usage in real-time, resulting in the ability save money when the prices
19 spike. Those same users will also have the ability to sell back excess energy
20 generated via home or business solar panels or wind turbines.

21
22 Overall, the Electric Power Research Institute provides a deemed conservative
23 estimate of 1 to 4 ration of cost to benefit for implementing an extensive smart
24 grid. The smart grid will be not only economical in terms of saving money, but
25 it will be good for the economy in general, as there will be tremendous gains in
26 job creation. Jobs will be created in everything from installing sensors and
27 building infrastructure of the smart grid to high-tech research and development
28 positions.

29
30 Environmentally Friendly – The overall improved efficiency described above will
31 also serve to decrease the overall energy consumption and waste. Furthermore,
32 because the smart grid will enable the deployment of all forms of generation
33 and storage, including those that are environmentally friendly, it will encourage

1 the deployment of such environmentally friendly energy generators. The greater
2 use of distributed energy will reduce the need for construction of new
3 transmission facilities and central power plants.

4
5 The smarter end-user management of energy will also have significant effects on
6 power consumption and the environment, as users it will be in the users' best
7 interests to avoid costly peak prices and try to use energy scheduled around
8 both cheap times and those when an environmentally-friendly source of energy
9 is available.

10
11 Unknown – Just like with the invention of the internet, it is impossible to tell
12 just how much the smart grid can ultimately change our lives. It could
13 potentially develop into an information and communication system around
14 which our lives circulate or simply be a more efficient way to run a grid.

15 16 **Smart Grid Options**

17
18 Smart grids can lead to more effective use of time or use rates, demand
19 response, and peak shaving.

20 21 **Time-of-Use Rates**

22
23 On islands such as O`ahu, the average daily peak load is twice as high as the
24 average daily minimum load. Flattening the load would lead to a more stable
25 grid and less need for costly peaking units which currently may be operated
26 only a small percentage of the time. the O`ahu peak is around 5-8 pm, requiring
27 peak power after the sun has set, but while concentrated solar power systems
28 could still provide electricity. Hawaiian Electric was an early implementer of
29 Time Of Use Rates; however their practice was to reward customers who had
30 flat loads (that is, customers who had the same energy demand 24/7. Modern
31 Time Of Use Rates rewards customers who use power off-peak. In its simplest
32 application, there would be three rates: off-peak, shoulder, and peak. The
33 spread varies by utilities, from 1 to 100 percent. The higher the discount for off-
34 peak use, the more customers will switch.

1 For customers with self-generation, and the willingness to forgo grid energy
2 during peak periods (weekdays 8 am to 10 pm), the customer could receive
3 discounted renewable energy during off-peak (weekends and nights: 10 pm - 8
4 am) similar to cell phone discounting. Electric vehicles would be powered at
5 night and could supply back-up power to the building during the day. The
6 building-vehicle energy system would provide energy for heating, cooling,
7 electricity and ground transportation.

8 9 **Demand Response ("DR")**

10
11 When the electrical grid nears peak capacity or when generators and/or
12 transmission lines fail, the utility can face serious problems.
13 Demand Response (DR) is a dynamic (real-time) method for the utility to curtail
14 the use of electricity by shedding customers or turning off customer appliances
15 such as electric water heaters and air conditioning. Customers signing up for
16 Demand Response often receive a discount on their electric rates in exchange
17 for the right to be curtailed.

18 19 **Peak Shaving**

20
21 Since the advent of man-made electricity, there has been a problem of uneven
22 daily electricity usage. In the 1870s and 1880s there was tremendous demand
23 for energy for lighting in the evenings. There was little demand for daytime
24 usage. To offset night-time energy use, hundreds of municipalities across the
25 country began offering electric trolley service.

26
27 This interfered with the advent of the automobile, so as the historically accurate
28 film "Who Framed Roger Rabbit?" pointed out, the automobile, fossil fuel and
29 timber interests purchased and destroyed the electric trolley in Los Angeles, so
30 that people could ride automobiles down freeways and get supplies along off-
31 ramps.

1 Now the problem is that there is much greater use of energy during the days.
2 On Oahu, the average of all daily peak loads is twice the average of all daily
3 minimal loads.

4
5 Some have suggested that we convert to electric vehicles and power them at
6 night. Night time electricity on O`ahu is produced by big continuously running
7 baseload generators, such as the AES 200 MW coal plant in Campbell
8 Industrial Park.

9
10 **Customer Usage**

11
12 Most customers have a meter that is read once a month by a meter reader. This
13 is a costly way of getting the data. By using internet-like chips, the meters can
14 be read automatically. But equally important for our discussions here, in order
15 to charge customers different rates at different times of the day (time of use
16 rates), to cut back customer use during critical periods (demand response) and
17 to level the load (peak shave), the utility must be able to track customer loads
18 several times within each day. Clearly this can't be done with meter readers, so
19 meters must become smart (able to communicate with the utility mainframe).

20
21 **HECO's Proposal**

22
23 This regulatory proceedings deals with Hawaiian Electric Company, Inc.
24 ("HECO"), and its subsidiaries Maui Electric Company, Limited, and Hawaii
25 Electric Light Company, Inc. (collectively, "HECO Companies") request to the
26 Public Utilities Commission ("Commission") approval of a 15-year contract with
27 Sensus Metering Systems, Inc. ("Sensus").

28
29 The Advanced Metering Infrastructure Equipment and Services Agreement
30 ("Sensus Agreement") is confidential.

31
32 This regulatory proceedings also deals with capital expenditures by the utility
33 (\$60M+ of ratepayer money), an Advanced Metering Infrastructure ("AMI")

1 system, a Meter Data Management System ("MDMS"), and establishment of
2 Time-Of-Use Rates ("TOUR"). "The AMI communications and smart metering
3 infrastructure provides a foundation for the implementation of Smart Grid
4 technology" (HECO Application page 7)
5
6 Hawaiian Electric Selects Sensus FlexNet AMI (TDWorld, Jan 8, 2009)
7 "Officials of Hawaiian Electric Co. and Sensus Metering Systems have
8 announced a 15-year definitive agreement for mass deployment of Sensus
9 Metering Systems' FlexNet wireless smart grid solution. The decision comes
10 after two years of rigorous field testing of the FlexNet system, where thousands
11 of smart electric meters were tested in a variety of settings, terrains and
12 environments on Oahu. Subject to Hawaii Public Utilities Commission approval
13 of Hawaiian Electric's AMI plan, approximately 430,000 residential and
14 commercial electric customers will be transitioned to the Sensus FlexNet smart
15 meters between 2009 and 2015. Just 19 tower network sites throughout Oahu,
16 Maui, and Hawaii Island will provide the advanced, two-way radio frequency
17 network coverage based on Sensus' primary use licensed frequency, which
18 allows for secure, reliable transmissions over a wide range. The FlexNet system
19 provides Hawaiian Electric with two-way communications to Sensus' iCon
20 smart electric meters, which enables on-demand reads, remote
21 connect/disconnect services, notifications of outages and restoration, and
22 remote firmware upgrades. FlexNet also establishes the platform for additional
23 customer and utility system-related benefits in the future. These features will
24 support new pricing and demand-response initiatives to help customers
25 manage their own electricity use by taking advantage of various pricing options,
26 and programs designed to enhance energy conservation efforts."
27 http://tdworld.com/info_systems/highlights/heco-sensus-flexnet-0109/

28 29 **Meter Reading**

30
31 Computer based meter reading can occur very often. Meters are read once an
32 hour in Denmark, Finland, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden; twice an hour in
33 the United Kingdom, four times an hour in Germany, Ireland, Netherlands,

1 Portugal and six times an hour in France. For HECO this information is sealed
2 under protective order. (Survey of regulatory and Technological Developments
3 Concerning Smart Metering in the European Union Electricity Market by Jorge
4 Vasconcelos (2008)

5 http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/bitstream/1814/9267/2/RSCAS_PP_08_01.pdf

6
7 **AMI does not mean AMI**

8
9 On the one hand “Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) technology continues
10 to improve every day and many utilities throughout the country are moving
11 from the pilot phase into full-scale AMI deployments.” (HECO Powerlines Fall
12 2007, HECO Application, Exhibit 14, page 10) And on the other hand, what
13 everyone is racing to do is not the same thing: “There is no single, universally
14 accepted definition of the components that, taken together, constitute an
15 advanced metering infrastructure. When analysts, utilities, regulators,
16 stakeholders and others use the term “advanced metering infrastructure” in the
17 case of electric utilities, they do tend to refer broadly to a collection of hardware
18 (e.g., meters and computer processors), software (e.g., billing system computer
19 programs) and other elements that taken together permit the utility to perform
20 certain functions.” (Sensus Agreement Summary Exhibit 2: page 1 of 3)

21
22 **Buzzwords**

23
24 The term “smart grid”, is sort of like “sustainability” or “smart growth”. Who
25 could be against it, but what does it mean beyond the buzzword?

26
27 Steven Brown, editor in chief of *Utility Automation & Engineering T&D* (March,
28 2008) stated: “There is, I think, a danger in the overuse of this term “smart
29 grid,” however. As I walked from booth to booth in the DistribuTECH exhibit
30 hall, I began to notice that nearly every supplier present had a “smart grid”
31 device or system to offer. In many cases, I found myself at an exhibitor’s booth
32 looking at roughly the same type of device or piece of software I’ve been seeing
33 at DistribuTECH for years—except this year, the product was emblazoned with

1 the new phrase du jour. I wasn't looking at a meter; I was looking at a smart
2 grid end-point device. I wasn't looking at a distribution automation system, or a
3 geographic information system, or an automated dispatch system; I was looking
4 at a smart grid solution. I'm pretty sure there were even circuit breakers on
5 display that boasted an IQ higher than mine. And maybe all those technologies
6 I've been seeing at DistribuTECH for nearly a decade really were smart grid
7 solutions all along—we just didn't know it until now. At some point, though, I
8 think a stricter definition of "smart grid" is in order, lest the term lose all
9 significance."

10
11 **Benefits**
12

13 Then there is the question of what we are seeking to do: reduce fossil fuel use,
14 increase energy efficiency, decrease outage time, lower rates, and/or increase
15 consumer costs?
16

17 "AMI refers to systems that measure, collect and analyze energy usage, from
18 advanced devices such as electricity meters, gas meters, and/or water meters,
19 through various communication media on request or on a pre-defined schedule.
20 This infrastructure includes hardware, software, communications, customer
21 associated systems and meter data management software. The network between
22 the measurement devices and business systems allows collection and
23 distribution of information to customers, suppliers, utilities and service
24 providers." (HECO Response to CA-IR-3, page 1) "The benefits of AMI can
25 generally be broken down into four types: (1) operational benefits (e.g., meter
26 reading savings and field service savings); (2) customer benefits (e.g., meter
27 accuracy gains and energy theft reduction); (3) future capital expenditure
28 reduction ... and (4) future systems benefits" (HECO Response to CA-IR-7, page
29 2)
30
31
32
33

1 **Which Smart Future?**

2
3 SciTechBlog: "Does the smart grid make you feel dumb? The latest buzzword
4 on the energy forefront is "smart grid." You may have seen the GE commercial
5 featuring a re-worked scarecrow from the "Wizard of Oz" touting smart-grid
6 products that promise to save you money, help keep the world green and make
7 pink bunnies grow like wildflowers in your yard (well maybe not – but they do
8 promise a lot). ... All of that is very cool, but it's a long way away. ... Our
9 current system is built around centralized power plants delivering energy to
10 nearby areas. What we need to take full advantage of wind and solar power is a
11 whole new grid — a decentralized one that can move power easily from one
12 place to another." ([http://scitech.blogs.cnn.com/2009/03/02/does-the-smart-](http://scitech.blogs.cnn.com/2009/03/02/does-the-smart-grid-make-you-feel-dumb/)
13 [grid-make-you-feel-dumb/](http://scitech.blogs.cnn.com/2009/03/02/does-the-smart-grid-make-you-feel-dumb/))
14

15 This is crucial. Do we want an overly centralized grid that can't add significant
16 renewables before 2015 because the Maui and Big Island Grids are already
17 saturated and on O'ahu, the utility is reserving renewable space for the Big
18 Wind Project (400 MW from Moloka'i and Lana'i) will be coming on-line in
19 2015?
20

21 Should we instead encourage rapid deployment of on-site generation? In
22 measuring success: What are the metrics, the measurements, the Baseline?
23

24 **Distributive not Command and Control**

25
26 In the US, the wall sockets can not be the basis for grid computing. For smart
27 grids, there is a need for access points that can be identified for data and
28 information transfer between the point of usage and the power generating
29 system. This is very similar to a computer access point, which enables a
30 connection to the internet. This need for a two-way communication mechanism
31 is crucial and investment-intensive.
32

1 Distributable power is the key to smart grids. The technology exists for
2 centralized generation and distribution but only in one direction - from the
3 electric provider to the customer. This poses a challenge to establish smart
4 grids that need to distribute power effectively on a platform which is more
5 diverse and easily distributable - not necessarily centralized.

6
7 I think the issue of distribute power is worth reinforcing. The utility can have
8 the smartest grid on the planet. If, on the supply side, the utility is not
9 committed to rapid development of wide-scale distributed (renewable)
10 generation (as evidenced by the utility's proposed feed-in tariff), then the utility
11 is starting by forfeiting half of the smart grid benefits - those related to dispatch
12 of distributed generation.

13
14
15
16 **Grid Studies Not Complete and/or Publicly Available**

17
18 The Studies have not yet been developed, and the non-HECO parties can't even
19 see the draft versions of Phase 1 of the Reports:

20
21 "the Companies commissioned the following studies of the Companies' electric
22 grids: (1) the General Electric Studies (HECO, MECO, and HELCO) ... Phase I ...
23 is being developed ... to establish a baseline condition. ... Phase 2, which will
24 analyze the technical and economic impact of infrastructure expansion
25 scenarios (more renewable energy and possible integration technologies) relative
26 to the baseline condition. ... more in-depth analysis and additional studies will
27 be required in order to determine the extent to which a particular system may
28 be able to integrate a specific project, and to evaluate the particular system
29 requirements associated with such integration.

30
31 The Phase 1 studies for both the HELCO and MECO systems [but not HECO]
32 have been completed. ... The HECO Companies are in the process of securing
33 final electronic versions of the documents and will make the studies available ...

1 to the parties via email, as soon as the electronic versions are secured.” (HECO
2 Companies’ Response to Life of the Land Information Request to HECO (LOL-IR-
3 1))

4 5 **Release of Grid Studies**

6
7 HECO should provide grid studies in a reasonable and timely way prior to the
8 date other parties must file Information Requests re HECO’s Testimony.

9 10 **Alternative Solutions**

11
12 The recent oil price spike triggered a reduction in demand for electricity. Would
13 a similar hike be more or less effective in reducing fossil fuel consumption that
14 AMI? How about an inverted block system with low costs for the first unit and
15 substantial increases for larger blocks.

16
17 Are there energy efficiency alternatives that could more effectively improve grid
18 operations? Could SAIC, after becoming fully operation in Hawai’i, offer
19 solutions that might be more cost-effective?

20
21 SAIC: “Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) ... is often confused with
22 Automated Meter Reading (AMR), which simply removes the human from the
23 mundane chore of performing monthly meter reads. AMR is actually a subset of
24 AMI. ... In order to change customer energy usage behavior, intelligent systems
25 to monitor energy consumption are needed to support interval or time
26 differentiated pricing, and provide mechanisms to viably reduce load during
27 peak periods. AMI supports the automated systems designed to manage this
28 process. Although this concept is nearly universally agreed upon, it is
29 complicated by vendors working to protect their proprietary solutions. Energy
30 companies struggle in deciding which AMI solution to choose since that
31 decision potentially locks them into a single vendor’s proprietary offering. There
32 is a critical need to have an open, vendor-neutral, abstraction layer between
33 utility back-office applications and the complex world of AMI. This layer needs

1 to insulate the energy companies from the myriad of proprietary communication
2 protocols, data formats, and 'smart' device interfaces. ... AMI has widespread
3 industry acceptance but limited implementation." (An Open Systems
4 Abstraction Layer Strategy by Michael Ash, Senior Scientist, SAIC; Stuart
5 McCafferty, Technical Manager, SAIC
6 http://www.energypulse.net/centers/article/article_display.cfm?a_id=1066)
7

8 HECO is not going with either an open source system.
9

10 **Risks**

11

12 "HECO executed an Advanced Metering Infrastructure Equipment and Services
13 Agreement, dated October 1, 2008 ("Sensus Agreement"), with its AMI vendor,
14 Sensus Metering Systems Inc. ("Sensus") (HECO Application, Exhibit 1, page 1
15 of 2) "the Companies executed a 15-year contract with Sensus" (HECO
16 Response to CA-IR-21(b)) "The AMI Network will be owned, operated, and
17 maintained by Sensus and leased by the HECO Companies per the Sensus
18 Agreement executed by the Companies. A shared MDMS will be centrally
19 located at HECO." (HECO Application, page 16) "The Sensus AMI meters will
20 have a one year warranty and an expected life of 15 years. In addition, based on
21 data provided by Sensus, the Companies anticipate a meter failure rate of 1%
22 per year." (HECO Application, page 21)
23

24 Just as with any other technology, the smart grid technology has some
25 drawbacks. One of the major disadvantages of smart grids is that it is not
26 simply a single component that consists of the technology. There are various
27 technology components such as: software, the power generators, system
28 integrators, etc. Not every company is on a level playing field to take the risks
29 necessary to build a smart grid. This is the reason many utility companies
30 refrain from venturing into this area. They want other companies to take the
31 risk so that they can follow later, safely.
32
33

1 **Contract Length**

2
3 HECO argued in its proposed biofuel contract with Imperium that in pioneering
4 new areas it was important to have a short contract so that lessons could be
5 learned. However, in this case, HECO is not going with a short-term contract
6 but a 15-year contract during a period of great transition.
7

8 **Dangers**

9
10 A number of risks have made the national press regarding AMI. These include"

11
12 (1) Cyber Security (hacking into utility programs to either affect the grid or to
13 obtain customer information). See Exhibit 2: Security Alert: Risks Change with
14 AMI by Betsy Loeff, Utilimetrics News Writer;
15

16 (2) Customer Privacy (access to customer information, knowing when the
17 customer is in or out, knowing what appliances they are using; those entrusted
18 with our privacy often don't have much incentive to respect it). See Exhibit 1:
19 Privacy Challenges Could Stall Smart Grid by Susan L. Lyon (June 1, 2009);
20

21 (3) Costs out of line with Rewards (gold-plating a new system where the costs
22 either exceed the benefit, or are far more expensive than other programs which
23 would achieve similar benefits).
24
25

26 **What are the risks re Security & Big Brother?**

27
28 One of the risks associated with the smart grid is that the end-users will not be
29 as enthusiastic or caring about their involvement within the smart grid system.
30 In the Boulder, Co. example, some users complained that the high-tech gadgets
31 were too confusing and difficult to understand, even though the city was chosen
32 because of its well-educated population.
33

1 Furthermore, other users stated that the process can be cumbersome, boring,
2 and time consuming, signaling that users may prefer to deal with lower energy
3 efficiency and higher prices to avoid dealing with the matter in general.

4 Nevertheless, development companies are in the works of making the
5 technology and the process in general more user-friendly, and once the
6 technology is around long enough for users to habituate to it, they should
7 become happy simply to take advantage of the innovation. Just think of how
8 much exponentially complex and yet user-friendly electronics and computers
9 have become over the past twenty years; the smart grid is in its developmental
10 stage. Also, if end-users are not that responsive to the price fluctuations of the
11 smart grid, then the average energy bill could be expected to go way up, as
12 consumers would be paying for at-peak energy prices. Furthermore, it is
13 questionable if businesses and many households have the option of avoiding
14 energy usage during peak times, leading to an unfair disadvantage for those
15 users.

16
17 The security of the grid to hacker attacks is in some question. It seems that
18 once the proper software technology can be developed, the smart grid has
19 potential, with the right programming, to be much more secure than the
20 current grid.

21
22 Because the smart grid will be completely computerized, with sensors indicating
23 problems and concerns along every part of the grid, operators will also be better
24 able to respond to better to any attack and detect it when something first
25 happens. Furthermore, the decentralized nature of the smart grid gives
26 operators far more options to mitigate a problem once it has occurred, as
27 different energy sources can be channeled to the affected sources. Also, because
28 the smart grid is decentralized, gaining control of a part of the system will have
29 little effect on the system as a whole, as no one part of the system can affect too
30 large of an area. Nevertheless, as the smart grid connects and controls so many
31 streams of information together, hackers may have more motives to get into the
32 system. The promoters of the smart grid may be blindly hoping that the system

1 will be secure; however, as some sources say that hacking into the system is
2 not all that difficult.

3
4 The risk of the smart grid becoming like Big Brother should not be overlooked,
5 as the technology associated with the smart grid can eventually form into
6 something resembling Big Brother quite closely. However, it is not the smart
7 grid itself that would be Big Brother, but the intentions behind those that
8 develop and implement it. The Big Brother issue has been addressed in various
9 ways where it has come up.

10
11 For example, last year, regulatory officials met a storm of protest in California
12 when they considered requiring all new homes have a thermostat that utilities
13 could remotely adjust.

14
15 However, the key to that story is that the regulators withdrew their proposal
16 when they saw it did not sit well with the public. Nevertheless, having the
17 ability to remotely control users' power to an extent could have significant
18 benefits for society as a whole, as scary as that sounds. If operators sense that
19 a blackout may be coming, turning down the thermostat by one degree of every
20 household could have significant implications and save the users from having
21 to deal with the blackout, at the expense of utility control. Also, giving the
22 automated computer have some levels of control can be beneficial to the users
23 and is part of the system in place in Boulder, Co. For example, having the
24 luxury of telling the computer that a user only wants air conditioning to be at
25 maximum only when there are renewable sources of energy available frees the
26 user from constantly having to monitor the grid information. Also, users can
27 have the option of letting utility companies control appliances like heaters and
28 air-conditioners to a small extent that the user chooses, say five degree range
29 for each, can also be beneficial for both user and utility. The users can benefit
30 from their thermostats automatically adjusting to price fluctuations to optimize
31 costs, and the utilities can solve problems and avoid blackouts. The overall
32 point about Big Brother is that yes, the smart grid may have the capability of
33 acting on Big Brother's behalf, but regulations and agreements can be set up to

1 avoid it. The Big Brother issue is the one issue I am really having problems
2 with, since the smart grid can become advanced enough that everything
3 plugged into the outlet will eventually be known to the utility company, letting
4 them know anything and everything in the home and when and how it's used.
5 It seems as if the users may have to throw away their rights to privacy to see all
6 the other benefits.

7
8 **What are the risks re Privacy & Cybersecurity?**
9

10 Hawai'i's Constitution is informed by our unique history: The illegal overthrow
11 of the Hawaiian Kingdom, the arrest and imprisonment of Queen Liliu'okalani,
12 the imposition of Martial law during World War II, the arrest and imprisonment
13 of Hawai'i citizens based solely on their Japanese ancestry. These visceral
14 events led to the strong privacy clauses enshrined in the Hawai'i Constitution.
15 These rights are stronger than those rights guaranteed by the U.S.
16 Constitution.

17
18 In an April 16, 2009 article, VP Biden outlined plans to distribute more than
19 \$3.3 billion in smart grid technology development grants and an additional
20 \$615 million for smart grid storage, monitoring and technology viability as part
21 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.
22 (Source: Vice President Biden Outlines Funding for Smart Grid Initiatives
23 <http://www.energy.gov/news2009/7282.htm>)
24
25

26 Life of the Land is adamant about upholding the privacy rights enshrined in our
27 Constitution. Our concerns stem from the fast track of this docket, thus our
28 highlighting the privacy issues involved with a two-way information system and
29 the need to engage all stakeholders before we start bartering away
30 constitutional rights. As Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall said,
31 "History teaches us that grave threats to liberty often come in times of urgency,
32 when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure."
33

1
2 On April 17, 2008 DOE announced membership of its newly-established
3 Electricity Advisory Committee. The 30 inaugural members will serve one- or
4 two-year terms and include some of the nation's top public and private sector
5 leaders in electricity policy, planning and operations. The Committee was
6 established to provide counsel to the Department on long-range planning and
7 priorities for the modernization of the Nation's electricity delivery infrastructure.

8
9 The following excerpts are from the Department of Energy's Electricity Advisory
10 Committee report released in December 2008 entitled, Smart Grid: Enabler of a
11 New Energy Economy.

12 (Source: www.ee.energy.gov/DocumentsandMedia/final-smart-grid-report.pdf)
13
14

15 Improved Security System 16

17 "While the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) has
18 developed Critical Infrastructure Protection standards to address
19 these issues, Smart Grid technology and capabilities will offer better
20 integration of these devices, increased use of sensors, and added
21 layers of control. Smart Grid technologies, however, can bring their
22 own cyber security concerns, which will require comprehensive, built-
23 in security during implementation. (page 8)
24

25 3.7 Security 26

27 The vision of a Smart Grid typically boasts enhanced system security.
28 Indeed, the report A Systems View of the Modern Grid, published by
29 the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Energy
30 Technology Laboratory (NETL) in January 2007, includes "resists
31 attack" as one of seven principal characteristics of the future Smart
32 Grid.³⁸ The DOE report goes on to list the following design features
33 and functions:
34

35 Identification of threats and vulnerabilities

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Protecting the network

Inclusion of security risk in system planning

Expected benefits include:

Reduced system vulnerability to physical or cyber attack

Minimal consequences of any disruption, including its extent, duration, or economic impact

Using security-related improvements to also help optimize reliability, communications, computing, decision-making support and self-healing

However, many of the technologies being deployed to support Smart Grid projects—such as smart meters, sensors, and advanced communications networks—can themselves increase the vulnerability of the grid to cyber attacks. Accordingly, it is essential that Smart Grid deployment leverage the benefits of increased threat awareness while mitigating against heightened security concerns. It will be a difficult task, but one that can be addressed by being aware of the risks and leveraging security best practices from other industries. "

...

CYBER SPACE POLICY REVIEW - Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure (Source: www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf Evaluate Potential Barriers Impeding Evolution of Public-Private Partnership

"...the Federal government should engage academia, civil liberties and privacy groups, advocates of open government, and consumers to ensure that government policy adequately considers the broad set of interests that they represent. Few problems can be reduced to a

1 discrete question of process, policy, or technology. Changes in
2 technology often precipitate policy considerations and may require
3 changes in existing processes. Changes in policy (for example,
4 adoption of regulation or tax incentives) can affect decisions regarding
5 procurement or technological research and development. The Federal
6 government could also consider ways in which it could focus more
7 resources on research into possible "game-changing" areas, such as
8 behavioral, policy, and incentive-based cybersecurity solutions. The
9 interwoven nature of these issues underscores the need to ensure that
10 all stakeholders' interests are represented." (page 19)

11
12 ...

13
14 Report: Cyber-Spies Studying U.S. Electricity Grid
15 <http://www.govtech.com/gt/637160>
16 Apr 8, 2009, By Matt Williams, Assistant Editor

17
18 "Computer spies from China, Russia and other countries are
19 tunneling into the U.S. electricity grid with increasing frequency in
20 order to study America's infrastructure, The Wall Street Journal
21 reported Wednesday. An unnamed intelligence official told the
22 newspaper that hackers have left behind software tools that could be
23 turned on during a war in order to damage critical infrastructure
24 systems.

25
26 The revelation comes amid growing public sentiment for transforming
27 the U.S. electrical grid into a "smart grid." It would rely upon IT to
28 help utility companies manage peak loads and allow consumers to sell
29 back excess power to the grid during off-peak hours.

30
31 An estimated \$11 billion from the economic stimulus bill President
32 Barack Obama signed in February is dedicated to enacting standards
33 for the smart grid and funding test cases..."

34
35 "A December 2008 report from the U.S. Department of Energy's
36 Electricity Advisory Committee said utilities are increasingly using

1 digital devices in substations to improve protection and increase
2 reliability and control. "However, these remotely accessible and
3 programmable devices can introduce cyber-security concerns,"
4 according to the report. While smart-grid technology offers more
5 layers of control, it will require built-in security during the
6 implementation, according to the report..."

7
8 Safe bets: Why cyber security should be part of AMI planning

9 [http://uaelp.pennnet.com/display_article/303682/22/AMI/AMIFA/none/1/Sa](http://uaelp.pennnet.com/display_article/303682/22/AMI/AMIFA/none/1/Safe-bets:-Why-cyber-security-should-be-part-of-AMI-planning/)
10 [fe-bets:-Why-cyber-security-should-be-part-of-AMI-planning/](http://uaelp.pennnet.com/display_article/303682/22/AMI/AMIFA/none/1/Safe-bets:-Why-cyber-security-should-be-part-of-AMI-planning/)

11
12 " Two-way threat

13
14 The two-way capability in most advanced metering infrastructures
15 presents a two-way threat. Hackers can poke their uninvited fingers
16 into utility assets -- like substations -- or compromise the privacy of
17 utility customers by peeking into their consumption data.

18
19 An example of privacy invasion might be this: A burglar uses meter
20 data to find a home where there is little or no consumption going on,
21 indicating that the house is unoccupied. ...

22
23 Meters themselves are tamper-proofed to be physically secure, he
24 continues, but what's going into the meter is not necessarily secure
25 electronically. That means someone potentially could compromise a
26 data packet going from a meter to a substation, thereby disrupting
27 substation operations or even moving the data on to damage the grid.
28 ...

29
30 Smarter but more vulnerable

31
32 Automated controls add complexity and vulnerability to utility
33 networks, too. For instance, advanced meters often have connection
34 and disconnection capabilities. With them, hackers might be able to
35 knock utility customers out of service."
36

1 Twenty Critical Controls for Effective Cyber Defense: Consensus Audit
2 Guidelines
3 <http://www.sans.org/cag/guidelines.php>
4 Version 2.0: May 9, 2009
5

6 "Summary

7 This document has been developed through the collaboration of a
8 diverse set of security experts. While there is no such thing as
9 absolute protection, proper implementation of the security controls
10 identified in this document will ensure that an organization is
11 protecting against the most significant attacks. As attacks change,
12 additional controls or tools become available, or the state of common
13 security practice advances, this document will be updated to reflect
14 what is viewed by the collaborating authors as the most important
15 security controls to defend against cyber attacks
16

17 The Twenty Critical Controls

18 These 20 critical security controls were agreed upon by knowledgeable
19 individuals from the groups listed above. The list includes 15 controls
20 that can be validated at least in part in an automated manner and five
21 that must be validated manually. It is important to note that the 20
22 control categories are not presented in order of priority. The process of
23 gathering these specific controls and subcontrols focused on
24 identifying the highest priority defenses and represent a subset of
25 controls found in other audit guidelines and documents. Each of the
26 20 categories is important and offers high-priority techniques for
27 thwarting real-world attacks.
28

29 Critical Controls Subject to Automated Collection, Measurement, and
30 Validation:
31

32 Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices

33 Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software

34 Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Laptops,
35 Workstations, and Servers

1 Secure Configurations for Network Devices such as Firewalls, Routers,
2 and Switches
3 Boundary Defense
4 Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of Security Audit Logs
5 Application Software Security
6 Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges
7 Controlled Access Based on Need to Know
8 Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation
9 Account Monitoring and Control
10 Malware Defenses
11 Limitation and Control of Network Ports, Protocols, and Services
12 Wireless Device Control
13 Data Loss Prevention
14 Additional Critical Controls (not directly supported by automated
15 measurement and validation):
16 Secure Network Engineering
17 Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises
18 Incident Response Capability
19 Data Recovery Capability
20 Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training to Fill Gaps”
21

22 Life of the Land wishes to emphasize the importance of bringing stakeholders
23 together (academia, civil liberties and privacy groups, advocates of open
24 government, and consumers) to ensure that government policy adequately
25 considers the broad set of interests that they represent. This proposal has wide
26 reaching implications that we wish to bring to the Commission’s attention.
27

28 **State Law**

29
30 Neither “Advanced Metering Infrastructure” nor “Smart Grid” are mentioned in
31 the Hawaii Revised Statutes. Yet HECO states: “AMI has - particularly in recent
32 years — received wide support at both state and federal levels, in the form of
33 measures including ... Hawaii legislature concerning the development of
34 renewable energy and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in Hawaii.” (HECO
35 Application, page 6)

1
2 **Timing**

3
4 The HECO Companies are rolling out new transformative dockets at a speed
5 never before seen in Hawaii since HECO was established in the 1800s and the
6 Public Utilities Commission ("Commission") was established in 1913.

7
8 All of these dockets are being rolled out and requested for approval between the
9 closing of the old Utility Planning process (Integrated Resource Planning ("IRP"))
10 and the new Utility Planning process (Clean Energy Scenario Planning
11 ("CESP")).

12
13 In the proposed CESP Framework docket, HECO is proposing to fast track
14 projects. The utility proposes to have a year to come up with a CESP plan. The
15 Commission must rule on it within 6 months. If the Commission rejects
16 anything they have to explain how it will financially impact the utility. If
17 something is in the CESP, there is a presumption that it is needed. However,
18 just because something is in the CESP does not mean that the utility must do
19 it. Furthermore, the utility may do anything outside of the CESP as long as it is
20 somehow consistent with the CESP Plan.

21
22 In its mad rush to throw out numerous interlocking dockets and to not
23 carefully analyze their interaction, the utility appears to be overly focused with
24 guaranteeing itself a large profit at a time when the rest of the State is
25 financially hurting.

26
27
28 **Increased Use of Renewables**

29
30 Smart Grids include both traditional renewable energy generation and
31 traditional expansion of the transmission & distribution system to enable these
32 facilities to interconnect to the grid. "Smart Grid technologies include ...
33 renewable energy resources" (HECO Application page 35) "AMI implementation

1 will help further FERC's stated objective of increasing transmission
2 infrastructure for renewable energy." (HECO Application, page 39)

3
4 We had heard it all before. In 1981-83 HECO create its holding company
5 ("Hawaiian Electric Industries") arguing that an unregulated child of its parent
6 could better support expansion of renewables. In 1984 HEI suggested the utility
7 could transform Hawaii with renewables by 2000. In the early years of the
8 2000s, HECO stated that the solution was an unregulated child ("Renewable
9 Hawai'i Inc"). Now HECO is saying that it is a smart grid and the adoption of
10 CESP principles designed to eliminate meaningful public review.

11
12 The bottom line is: will AMI reduce greenhouse gas emissions, reduce the
13 importation of fossil fuel, increase the use of renewable energy, be cost-effective,
14 be more reasonable than the other alternatives, lead to greater reliance on
15 central station or distributed generation facilities, lead to greater control by the
16 monopoly utility or a more diverse economy, increase or decrease rates? There
17 is nothing in the Application that answers these questions.

18
19 **Do people want a Smart Grid?**

20
21 Because the definition of a smart grid is variable, along with its multiple
22 manifestations and proposals, the answer to this question is it depends.

23
24 **Opposition Elsewhere**

25
26
27 By Stephen Simon (Wall Street Journal, February 9, 2009) "Beyond that, the
28 very concept of the smart grid is controversial on many fronts. Some
29 homeowners find it Orwellian, while consumer advocates tend to see it as a
30 wasteful extravagance; they say utilities should focus on improving efficiency
31 instead of spending billions on futuristic technology -- and passing the tab on
32 to ratepayers. ... Not all consumers are likely to be so enthusiastic. Some early
33 experiments with smart-grid ideas have seen considerable opposition. In

1 California last year, regulatory officials drew a storm of protest when they
2 considered requiring all new homes to have thermostats that utilities could
3 remotely adjust. They withdrew the proposal, which critics said smacked of Big
4 Brother. ... Arshad Mansoor, a vice president of the Electric Power Research
5 Institute, calls customer response a significant roadblock to smart grid. He's
6 hopeful that the Boulder experiment will help utilities figure out how to smooth
7 the way.

8 <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123378462447149239.html>

9
10 Given the potential inconvenience and 'Big Brother' aspect of utilities
11 controlling home appliances, it's time to convince energy users, By Josie
12 Garthwaite Business Week (April 19, 2009)

13
14 Making the smart grid's most basic elements—two-way communication between
15 utilities and energy users, advanced control systems, and smart devices—
16 appealing to consumers could be key to its success. So how can smart grid
17 backers make the investment look more like a boon and less like a boondoggle
18 to those on the other side of the meter? ... For many utilities, adding
19 information technology and two-way controls to electronic devices and
20 appliances represents a potential gold mine of efficiency and a workaround for
21 building expensive new power plants. ... For consumers, however, the benefits
22 of the smart grid have proven to be less obvious, despite promises that it will
23 offer more insight and control over their energy use (and spending). "It turns
24 out customers don't actually want utilities to turn off their appliances," said
25 Farber, referring to the two-way control technology that would allowing a utility
26 to cut power use when demand strains supply.

27 [http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/apr2009/tc20090419_713](http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/apr2009/tc20090419_713545.htm)
28 [545.htm](http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/apr2009/tc20090419_713545.htm)

30 **Concerns**

31
32 US Energy System Poised To Make Digital Leap (June 6, 2009): "Energy
33 Secretary Steven Chu, said the current grid stands in the way of increasing the

1 use of renewable energy sources such as wind and solar that 'will need a
2 system that can dispatch power here, there and everywhere on a very quick
3 basis.' But Chu and others also worry about security. 'If you want to create
4 mischief one very good way to create a great deal of mischief is to actually bring
5 down a smart grid system. This system has to be incredibly secure. And there is
6 the issue of intrusion. 'Is the average consumer willing to pay the upfront costs
7 of a new system and then respond appropriately to price signals? Or will people
8 view a utility's ability to reach inside a home to turn down a thermostat as
9 Orwellian?' Sen. Lisa Murkowski, R-Alaska, said at a recent hearing on smart
10 grid."

11 [www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/09/smart-grid-us-energy-](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/09/smart-grid-us-energy-syst_n_212985.html)
12 [syst_n_212985.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/09/smart-grid-us-energy-syst_n_212985.html)

13
14 Testimony of Commissioner Suedeen G. Kelly, Federal Energy Regulatory
15 Commission. Before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United
16 States Senate (March 3, 2009) "A critical issue as Smart Grid is deployed is the
17 need to ensure grid reliability and cyber security. The significant benefits of
18 Smart Grid technologies must be achieved without taking reliability and
19 security risks that could be exploited to cause great harm to our Nation's
20 citizens and economy. Finally, if the intent of Congress is for the Smart Grid
21 standards to be mandatory beyond the scope of the Federal Power Act,
22 additional legislation should be considered."

23 www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20090303121917-09-03-03-testimony.pdf
24

25 **Questions**

26
27 How the installation of advanced meters and/or implementation of dynamic
28 pricing, and remote functionality implicate existing privacy and consumer
29 protection policies and programs.

30
31 Whether some customer groups benefit more than others, and whether some
32 customer groups benefit while others are harmed.

1 Whether potential costs and benefits vary across customer group or
2 geographically.

3
4 Whether perceived benefits can be achieved in another, more cost effective way.

5
6 Whether time based rates and other dynamic pricing programs should be
7 mandatory or optional, and the customer impact of each.

8
9 Whether the metering technology is reliable, including the life expectancy in
10 terms of both functional life and technical obsolescence.

11
12 Should the Commission consider a contingency plan for rendering and
13 reconciling bills should the met.

14
15 **Life of the Land's Position**

16
17 1. Is the HECO Companies' proposal to implement the AMI project reasonable?

18
19 In general, AMI is a reasonable approach. The Devil is in the details. It appears
20 that the utility is simultaneously developing and implement its AMI approach.
21 This is similar to making an airplane while it is being flown on its maiden
22 voyage. We defer stating a position on this issue at this time, pending HECO's
23 release of additional documents including grid integration studies necessary to
24 understand their proposal, and for the declassification of specified sections
25 listed above.

26
27 Life of the Land believes that climate change is a very serious issue and must
28 be dealt with immediately. It is unclear to us how this Application will directly
29 or indirectly impact efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, including
30 issues dealing with the opportunity cost of money and the utility's desire to
31 update an antiquated, aging, dumb, one-way grid instead of fully looking at
32 alternatives.

1 2. Are the estimated project costs reasonable?

2
3 We defer at this time, pending HECO's release of documents necessary to
4 understand their proposal.

5
6 3. Is the proposed accounting treatment of AMI project costs reasonable?

7
8 We defer at this time, pending HECO's release of documents necessary to
9 understand their proposal.

10
11 4. Is the proposed cost recovery of AMI project costs for ratemaking purposes
12 reasonable?

13
14 Life of the Land accepted the surcharge concept developed in previous dockets.
15 Its application makes sense in this docket providing that the Application is
16 reasonable. See answer number 1.

17
18 5. Are the terms and conditions of the Sensus Agreement between HECO and
19 Sensus Metering Systems, Inc. reasonable, prudent and in the public interest?

20
21 The Agreement is confidential. The contract should be made public with phrase
22 by phrase blacked-out sections instead of treating the entire document as
23 confidential.

24
25 6. Are the proposed time of use rates reasonable?

26
27 We favor time of use rates but need more information before making a decision
28 on this particular application. Life of the Land needs a better understanding of
29 how Time Of Use Rates interact with a host of related issues including but not
30 limited to: Feed In Tariffs, Net Metering, PV Host, and Vehicle To Grid (V2G).

31
32 **Exhibit 1**: Privacy Challenges Could Stall Smart Grid
33 By Susan L. Lyon (June 1, 2009)

1 President Barack Obama's plan to overhaul U.S. infrastructure includes
2 constructing a nationwide "smart grid" that promises to help address many of
3 our current energy challenges. The smart grid plan offers the hope that it "will
4 save us money, protect our power sources from blackout or attack, and deliver
5 clean, alternative forms of energy to every corner of our nation."
6

7 While these are noble societal goals, smart grid technologies and systems as
8 envisioned also raise concerns about individual privacy rights.
9

10 Part of what makes the smart grid "smart" is its ability to know a lot about the
11 energy-consuming devices in our homes and to monitor activity for those
12 devices to help determine when power should be used or limited. Such
13 knowledge is useful in regulating power consumption to use energy more
14 efficiently.
15

16 In addition to reaching into homes to regulate devices, information about usage
17 and activities could be extracted from homes. Home energy consumption
18 patterns could be gathered and analyzed on a room-by-room and device-by-
19 device basis to determine which devices are used and at what time of day.
20 Although this sort of information may not be considered terribly invasive for
21 some, for others anything that violates the sanctity of "home" may cause
22 tremendous concern.
23

24 Those not concerned by the tracking of mere energy usage may become more
25 concerned as devices in our home become increasingly "smarter." One can
26 easily envision a not too distant state of technology convergence where such
27 devices could be used to track more sensitive information. For example,
28 security technology already exists to monitor presence in homes to detect
29 break-ins. Could that same technology be applied in a smart-grid environment
30 to monitor when residents are home?
31

32 What else will smart appliances "tell" others about households? Will a smart
33 refrigerator be able to determine and disclose the types and quantities of RFID-
34 chipped food products and pharmaceuticals stored on shelves? Who will get
35 this information? Will retailers be able to access this information and use it for
36 marketing and services? Will law enforcement? Concerns such as these are
37 already top of mind for academics and consumer privacy rights advocates as
38 these technologies develop.
39

40 These privacy concerns in relation to the smart grid were heightened recently
41 with the introduction of a federal cybersecurity bill earlier this year. The
42 Cybersecurity Act aims to protect our nation's infrastructure, including our
43 energy grid, from threats by malicious hackers, terrorists and foreign
44 intelligence. Privacy advocates and some industry associations have expressed
45 concern about a provision in the bill that would allow access to "relevant data"
46 of private sector information systems and preempt all other laws.
47

48 This provision has been viewed as an attempt at an end run around legal
49 processes afforded by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) and
50 the Privacy Act of 1974 to allow greater government surveillance. In considering

1 legislation and policies designed to protect the smart grid, these concerns about
2 preserving current privacy protections will need to be balanced against the
3 importance of national security.

4
5 Private entities will also need to take privacy into account as they develop smart
6 appliances and smart grid systems and processes. Existing privacy laws will
7 place restrictions on many of the types of monitoring and data collection
8 activities envisioned. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act
9 requires companies to adhere to their privacy policies and to engage in fair
10 privacy practices. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act places restrictions on
11 information obtained from devices through its prohibitions against
12 unauthorized access to private computers and systems.

13
14 In addition to taking into account existing laws, companies that develop smart
15 grid technology would be wise to anticipate consumer reaction to privacy
16 impacting systems and features and the policies and laws that continue to
17 develop in this area. Fair information practice principles such as those
18 recommended by the FTC provide a good roadmap for developing practices and
19 process that address emerging privacy concerns and laws. The main principles
20 to consider will be in the areas of notice and choice.

21
22 Companies developing smart grid processes and devices should consider how to
23 provide consumers notice about what information is collected from and about
24 their homes and households, who is getting the information, and for what
25 purposes the information will be used. Companies should also develop means
26 to allow consumers to have choice and control over the information that gets
27 collected and disclosed.

28
29 The nature of the smart grid requires ubiquitous deployment of monitoring
30 technology in every home it touches. The impact of this is significant
31 considering that privacy of the home is such an important value in our society
32 that its protection is guaranteed in the U.S. Bill of Rights, "The right of the
33 people to be secure in their ... houses ... shall not be violated." So while the
34 benefits of a unified national smart grid system are very clear to most, as with
35 any technology, the systems that provide these societal benefits and the policies
36 that shape them should be designed to account for the privacy concerns of the
37 individuals they serve.

38
39 About the Author: Susan L. Lyon, of counsel in law firm Perkins Coie's Privacy
40 & Security practice, has extensive experience representing multinational
41 companies on privacy, data security, online safety and Internet laws

42
43 **Exhibit 2: Security Alert: Risks Change with AMI (April 2008)**

44 By Betsy Loeff, Utilimetrics News Writer

45
46 The process of meter reading has always had a laundry list of liabilities. Fender
47 benders, dog bites, slips, trips and falls: They're common meter-reader
48 mishaps.

1 Many utilities add the loss of these hazards to the benefits listed in an AMR
2 business case. But while automation slashes the workday woes human meter
3 readers face, it doesn't free utilities from liability completely. It changes the
4 risks from the physical to more extensive information protection.
5 Implementation of AMI and demand response technologies prompts cyber-
6 security and customer-information privacy issues to arise.

7
8 Even in today's world of manual meter reads, the reads are put onto a handheld
9 device, set in a cradle and sent back into the utility's information system, so the
10 loss of a hand-held is an issue, even if it is encrypted. Such a device may
11 contain more customer specific information than an AMI meter even would. It is
12 this always-on connection that elevates the issue of security.

13 14 Wired Open World

15
16 When, with the plant owner's permission, IBM researcher Scott Lunsford
17 hacked into a nuclear power plant last year, he wasn't trying to make mischief.
18 He was trying to make a point: Utility systems can be breached.

19
20 Forbes covered the event in a story titled, "America's Hackable Backbone." In it,
21 writer Andy Greenberg pointed out that the vulnerable underbelly of utilities
22 tends to rest in their supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems.

23
24 That was certainly the case when Vitek Boden, a disgruntled former employee of
25 the Maroochy Water System in Queensland, Australia, hacked into utility
26 systems using a laptop and proprietary SCADA equipment he carried around in
27 his car. Boden managed to disrupt pumping operations, thereby spilling sewage
28 throughout that little corner of Australia's Sunshine Coast. All he had to do was
29 send the right commands to critical valves.

30
31 A similar attack could unleash mayhem for electric utilities with remote
32 disconnection switches built into AMI meters. "We need to make sure the 13-
33 year-old hacker next door can't go and turn all those disconnects off in a wide
34 area," says Erich Gunther, chairman, chief technology officer and co-founder of
35 EnerNex Corporation, an energy-industry research firm and consultancy based
36 in Knoxville, Tenn.

37
38 Gunther is a member of the U.S. Department of Energy's GridWise Architecture
39 Council, lead consultant with the Electric Power Research Institutes IntelliGrid
40 project and founder of several utility working groups and task forces examining
41 AMI. One is AMI-SEC, a subgroup of UtilityAMI that focuses specifically on
42 security issues.

43
44 According to him, there are few standards and "a total absence of best practices
45 in the security area." But, he's out to change that.

46 47 Picture The Worst

48
49 "The issue is that the utility industry hasn't taken security seriously in field
50 devices," Gunther maintains. Last year, the North American Electric Reliability

1 Corporation issued a list of critical-infrastructure protection standards to
2 safeguard the transmission system, "but it doesn't address the new
3 vulnerabilities for devices that have integrated service disconnects and
4 pathways into the home."

5
6 Gunther isn't concerned that AMI creates a pathway into utility systems. While
7 communications networks used in metering allow utilities to send signals to
8 customers and retrieve data from those end-user sites, he maintains, "there's
9 no easy way someone could use the meter to go back and make a request on
10 the utility system." Today's architectures hinder such malfeasance.

11
12 "The greatest vulnerabilities are the potential impact on the end users,"
13 Gunther continues. He cites unauthorized control of remote disconnection
14 capabilities as the biggest danger, and it's one that now exists for water
15 utilities, too, as several vendors offer disconnection valves. "It's huge. If
16 someone found a way to operate those disconnects in a wide area, he could
17 cause widespread outages."

18
19 Another peril for electricity providers lies in what Gunther calls "spoofing a load
20 control signal."

21
22 Suppose a hacker found a way to make in-home load-shedding devices think
23 some sort of grid-instability event was afoot. By sending a false curtailment
24 signal, that hacker could prompt in-home equipment to shut down the pool
25 pump, cycle off the air conditioner or cut the heating element on a clothes
26 dryer, for starters. Such action might simply cause consumers inconvenience.
27 But, what if the hacker sent the same sort of false signal telling all the
28 equipment to come back on during a critical peak? Blackouts could follow,
29 Gunther says.

30
31 The same is true if a hacker interfered with the load-curtaillment signals sent by
32 a utility. "If the utility is activating all of its demand-response capabilities so
33 that they don't have to go into rolling blackouts and someone interferes, boom,
34 you're back in the blackout scenario," he continues.

35 36 Ganging Up On The Problem

37
38 AMI-SEC, the group Gunther co-chairs, is taking a comprehensive look at
39 threats like these and strategizing ways to meet them.

40
41 According to Gunther, there are cryptographic means to mitigate risks, as well
42 as simple business rules that could safeguard utilities and their customers.
43 With respect to exposure to external attack over communication channels, he
44 offers this example: "Have a business rule that says no external command can
45 result in an increase of electricity usage."

46
47 Although the AMI-SEC is not a standards group per se, participants hope to
48 have the same kind of "successful" sway as the parent organization, UtilityAMI,
49 had in influencing vendors' product development, Gunther says.

1 Such utility collaboration could offer important leverage because, as Deidre
2 Mulligan notes, "privacy and security don't tend to be competitive features in
3 the marketplace as standalone features," so vendors have less incentive to focus
4 on these issues.

5
6 As IT organizations take a larger role in AMI, the issue of security has become
7 more prominent. It is in all RFI/RFP solicitations, and is the focus of technical
8 evaluations. Many AMI vendors have performed internal and external threat
9 analysis and security reviews. From an evaluation standpoint, there is no
10 standard basis on which to judge and compare different systems in this area.

11
12 Mulligan is a clinical professor of law at University of California's Berkeley
13 School of Law, and she was a key researcher contributing to the 2005 report on
14 "Network Security Architecture for Demand Response/Sensor Networks" that
15 was produced for the California Energy Commission (CEC).

16
17 According to her, it's difficult for vendors to earn payback for security features
18 because it's tough to prove things didn't happen as a result of the preventative
19 action you took. That is, vendors would be hard pressed to say, "Because we
20 have a really secure meter, we didn't have any exposure, so trouble didn't crop
21 up." That, she says, makes it challenging to decide how much to invest in
22 security protections.

23
24 Mulligan thinks that once utilities, regulators and technology vendors identify
25 risks and solutions, "the market will sort it out. If it turns out that utilities are
26 not going to buy meters unless the data are encrypted at the source, then that
27 will happen. If it turns out the utilities can encrypt the data in transit or create
28 some kind of encrypted channel, then that will happen."

29
30 Encryption is one of the key security recommendations Mulligan and her team
31 came up with for the CEC. At the time the report was created, "a lot of
32 information flows were in a proprietary format, not encrypted," she explains.
33 "That introduces opportunities for mischief at the ground level in ways that
34 utilities should be concerned about."

35
36 The lengthy report offers much insight into how AMI networks operate, where
37 weak links exist and what might be good ways to shore them up. Among the
38 areas to fortify against intrusion, it lists:

39
40 Communications links: Information should flow only between authorized users
41 and endpoints.

42
43 Data integrity: Make sure the data are accurate, and protect them against
44 unauthorized changes or deletion.

45
46 Access control: Limit access to data, network resources and applications to
47 authorized users only.

48
49 Authentication: Confirm identities of communicating entities — people, devices
50 and applications — and validate the integrity of messages.

1
2 Non-repudiation: Tracking methods could prevent hackers from denying that
3 they performed a particular action on the network by creating a cyber
4 breadcrumb trail.

5
6 Data confidentiality: Don't just keep the data under lock and key. Make certain
7 unauthorized users can't understand it. "Encryption, access control lists and
8 file permissions" are three tools to use, according to the report.

9
10 Customer privacy is another area covered by the CEC document, and it is likely
11 to be something utilities will need to guard closely.

12
13 For one thing, privacy of a customer's usage information can be a security risk
14 to customers themselves. "Many utilities will be streaming real-time usage data
15 into customers' homes," Gunther notes. "A thief could be trolling around the
16 neighborhood, looking for usage that's really low," or discerning when people go
17 to work based on the trends that show up in their consumption patterns.
18 "There are real issues from a crime aspect when someone can understand
19 another person's schedule just by looking at energy usage."

20
21 [www.utilimetrics.org/source/newsletter/index.cfm?fuseaction=Newsletter.show](http://www.utilimetrics.org/source/newsletter/index.cfm?fuseaction=Newsletter.showThisIssue&Issue_ID=69)
22 [ThisIssue&Issue_ID=69](http://www.utilimetrics.org/source/newsletter/index.cfm?fuseaction=Newsletter.showThisIssue&Issue_ID=69)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The original and 8 copies of the foregoing LIFE OF THE LAND's TESTIMONY & MOTION FOR DISCLOSURE in Docket 2008-0303 was filed with the Public Utilities Commission and served on the date of filing by e-mail to the following parties:

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